

SEC. 8, 1907/15724 November 1958Pages 856 - 867, incl.NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

BERLIN SITUATION (U)

1. At their meeting on 24 November 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Noted the position papers in Enclosures "A" and "B" and authorized their use as Joint Staff position papers in the State-Defense-JCS Ad Hoc Working Group.

b. Agreed to forward the memorandum in Enclosure "C", together with its Appendix, to the Secretary of Defense.

2. The memorandum in Enclosure "C", dated 24 November 1958, together with its Appendix, was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

H. L. HILLYARD,

J. O. COBB,

Joint Secretariat.

*see n/H dated 11-26-58*  
*see Corr dated 12-1-58*  
Classified by \_\_\_\_\_  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31 1982

RECEIVED

ENCLOSURE "A"

BERLIN SITUATION

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the implications involved should it become  
necessary to use military force to maintain allied rights and  
position in Berlin as set forth in current Quadripartite agreements

ASSUMPTIONS

2. The Soviets intend to hand over to the GDR those functions  
in Berlin which are now reserved for Soviet organs.

3. The United States, United Kingdom and France have agreed  
that they will not recognize the alleged legal right of the  
GDR to take over Soviet functions which were mutually agreed  
to by the occupying powers.

4. Despite allied objections the Soviets may eventually impose  
through the GDR unacceptable restrictions, or partial, or  
complete blockade of Berlin directed principally at the allied  
garrisons in Berlin.

5. Declarations of allied intentions to use military force will  
be made to the Soviets prior to the use of military force.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

6. Allied ground forces in Berlin comprise approximately  
11,000 men as follows:  
United States - two battle groups and a tank company (4200);  
United Kingdom - three infantry battalions and a tank company  
(2700); French - two infantry battalions (1000); and the West  
Berlin police force (3000). Soviet and GDR ground forces in  
Germany total approximately 501,000 men as follows:  
Vicinity of Berlin - 4 Soviet divisions (38,500) and the East  
Berlin police force (3000); East Germany - 20 Soviet divisions  
(315,000) and 7 German divisions (145,000).

## DISCUSSION

7. The relative strengths listed in paragraph 6 above clearly indicate that the use of only the allied forces in Berlin to maintain continuous free access to Berlin in face of determined opposition is not feasible. The military forces available to CINCEUR, together with additional forces which could be made available to him, are adequate to maintain the Allied rights and position in Berlin if opposed only by GDR forces. Such engagement of forces is unlikely, however, in view of the defeat this would entail for overall Soviet objectives, and would therefore probably lead to general war. However, an examination of overall friendly and enemy orders of battle available for early reinforcement of the forces in paragraph 6 reveals no change in relative strengths in favor of the U.S. Therefore, it is not militarily acceptable to commit a large proportion of U.S. forces in Europe to a fight for continuous free access to Berlin if a general war appears probable. This would only lead to maldeployment for general war and to the risk of losing the forces without accomplishing the purpose at hand.

8. In view of the above the allied course of action most likely to succeed is to convince the Soviet that the allies are determined to maintain their position in Berlin to the extent of engaging in general war if required. The courses of action open to the Soviets in face of this allied position are:

- a. Back-down in face of the threat of allied force.
- b. Support the GDR in employing harassing tactics to impede Allied access to Berlin.
- c. Oppose allied forces with GDR forces only, reinforcing them covertly with "volunteers" or Soviet forces.
- d. Engage allied forces with Soviet forces in a general war.

9. It appears probable that the Soviets do not desire general war at this time and therefore would not risk it to attain their objectives in Berlin. Accordingly it seems likely that they would discard the latter two courses of action because either could lead to general war. It should be noted that if the Soviets do not back down and subsequently support the GDR in determined military opposition the situation could rapidly develop into general war. Appropriate measures should then be taken by the allies to attain a high state of national readiness, to include preparation for mobilization prior to the use of force.

10. Subsequent to our declaration of intent to use force if necessary, but prior to the use of such force, certain actions should be taken by the allies or by the United States unilaterally to manifest our intentions; for example:

- a. Alert allied forces.
- b. Redeploy ground and air units to optimize employment of forces in Germany.
- c. Cancel passes and leaves.
- d. Simulate operational traffic on tactical radio nets where necessary.

11. Allied participation in any military action in this situation is essential. It will also indicate a significant allied solidarity and will offer a greater chance to gain Soviet recognition of allied determination not to relinquish right of access to Berlin. In the event the allies do not support military action in this situation some of the principal effects would be:

- a. Probable requirement for an airlift.
- b. Probable necessity for some form of recognition of the GDR.
- c. Furtherance of Soviet objectives.
- d. Deterioration of the NATO alliance for the long term

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12. In summary it is concluded that:

a. A firm declaration should be made now by the United States and allies that we do not intend to recognize or deal with the GDR, that we will not allow the GDR to impede the exercise of any rights we presently hold, that we will not accept any control by the GDR over our movements to and from Berlin, and that we will use force if necessary to enforce our rights.

b. A convoy supported by appropriate force should be utilized to test GDR intentions and to force the issue promptly at the time of turn over of control of Berlin to the GDR by the USSR.

c. The use of force will not necessarily insure continued access to Berlin or the maintenance of our rights in Berlin since rail and road communications can otherwise be disrupted.

d. If a decision is made to use continued force beyond that necessary to test intentions, appropriate measures should be taken by the Allies to attain a high state of national readiness to include preparation for the initiation of appropriate mobilization measures (NSC 5803).

e. The use of force could possibly result in general war; however, it appears unlikely that the Soviets would risk general war to attain their objectives in Berlin.

f. Allied participation in any military action in this situation is essential.

ENCLOSURE "B"

BERLIN SITUATION

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the implications of a Berlin Airlift in support of Allied military forces in Berlin.

DISCUSSION

2. Latest information on stock status of supplies in Berlin Command, (U.S.) is as follows:

Class I	- 150 days authorized and on hand (except perishables).
Class II and IV	- 150 days authorized and on hand.
Class III	- Mogas - 360 days authorized and on hand.
	- Other POL products - 120 days authorized and on hand
	- Solid Fuels - 1 year supply (70,000 tons).
Class V	- 20 days supply at combat rates.

3. No significant shortages exist in Berlin Command (U.S.).

4. Best information available on British and French personnel in Berlin is that in numbers their combined total is approximately equal to that of the U.S. forces and that the stockpiles maintained by the British and French forces are equal to or greater than those of the U.S. garrison.

5. CINCUSAREUR has reported\* that the Berlin airlift plan provides for 50 tons daily for U.S. Berlin Military Command which is considered adequate for perishables as well as other emergency requirements. It is estimated that 50 additional tons daily would provide for British and French forces. The above would not include replenishment of stockpiles.

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\* CINCUSAREUR Message to Dept of Army Number SX-7752  
DTG 191550Z Nov 50, on file in Joint Secretariat *int*

6. During the 1948-1949 Berlin Airlift Operation, requirements reached a peak of 763 tons per day to support the U.S., British, and French military. This represents best available information as to total requirements for full resupply of military forces.

7. Headquarters USAF Operations Plan 5-57 "Berlin Airlift (Reduced)", dated 13 March 1957, in support of Headquarters US EUCOM Plan (Berlin) 12-55, is based on utilizing theater assigned transport aircraft (1 Wing C-119s; 1 Wing C-130s; 1 Squadron C-124s). This plan is not current as it does not reflect the phase-out of the C-123 aircraft and the introduction of the C-130 aircraft. Otherwise, the plan is valid and establishes L-day as the day flight operations start and provides for the following phased capability into Berlin, which will also meet the outbound requirements. See Appendix hereto for Tabulation of Assigned Theater Transport Aircraft Capability.

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Average Daily Tons Lifted</u>	<u>Tons per Month</u>
L to L <sub>7</sub> 3	300	
L thru L <sub>7</sub> 30	1,000	30,000
L <sub>7</sub> 31 thru L <sub>7</sub> 60	1,520	45,600

If necessary, augmentation of the transport aircraft in the theater could be made from MATS. For example, the addition of 30 C-124s would provide a homogeneous transport fleet with a capability of lifting 1520 tons per day (45,600 tons per month), and would free the C-130s and C-119s for normal intra-theater use.

8. Capability for interference with this airlift operation could include:

a Withdrawal of Soviet participation in the Berlin Air Safety center with resultant implication in the safety of

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Allied air operations in the corridor airspace, i.e., Employment of Soviet fighter aircraft in harassing tactics against Allied transport aircraft within the corridor airspace.

b. Use of communications jamming or electronics counter-measures against navigation and air traffic control.

#### CONCLUSIONS

9. Present stock status of Allied forces in Berlin is excellent. There are no significant shortages.

10. There is adequate intra-theater airlift immediately available to supply perishable and emergency requirements of Allied forces in Berlin.

11. CINCUSAFE plan which provides for a build-up of tonnage delivered to 1520 tons per day is in excess of the expected requirement for full resupply of the Allied military forces in Berlin

12. There are no logistical implications which would preclude an airlift resupply of Allied forces in Berlin.



APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "B"

CAPABILITY\* OF USCINCEUR ASSIGNED THEATER TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

Daily Capability Tons Under  
Various Utilization Rates

<u>No</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Payload</u>	<u>(2 hrs)</u>		<u>(4 hrs)</u>		<u>(6hrs)</u>	
			<u>Trips</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Trips</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Trips</u>	<u>Tons</u>
12	C-124	25	7	175	14	350	21	525
43	C-130	17	20	476	50	952	34	1428
43	C-119	8	25	200	50	400	75	600
			60	851	120	1702	180	2553

\* Based on assumption aircraft will operate from the Frankfurt, Wiesbaden Area

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D.C.

24 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Berlin Situation (U)

Reference: USCINCEUR Message EC 9-6265 dated 23 November  
1958 (DA IN 171903)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the views of General Norstad as expressed in reference message.

2. The implications involved in GDR control of checkpoints is currently under consideration by representatives of State, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Due to the urgency of the matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that positive action on the Berlin Situation should be taken without delay.

3. It is recommended that the Secretary of Defense request the Secretary of State, as a matter of urgency, to take the following action:

✓ a. Concur in the dispatch to USCINCEUR of the message in the Enclosure\* hereto.

b. Obtain approval to force the issue promptly by dispatching a test convoy supported by appropriate force, if the checkpoints are turned over completely to GDR control.

c. Seek British and French agreement simultaneously to inform the Soviet Government immediately and preferably without public announcement that we do not intend to recognize or deal with GDR; that we will not allow the GDR to impede the exercise of any right we presently hold; that we will not accept any control by the GDR over our movements to and from Berlin; and that we will use force if necessary to enforce our rights.

\* Appendix hereto

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d. At the same time secure British and French accord to seize the initiative and emphasize allied support by proposing a four-power conference on Germany in the immediate future.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ N. F. TWINING,  
Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
JCS 1007/157

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Enclosure 101

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "C"

D R A F T

FROM: JCS  
TO: USCINCEUR  
INFO: CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE  
REF: EC 9-6265 dated 23 Nov 58

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur that we should continue to operate U.S. military convoys as in the past so long as the check points are under Soviet control to the extent of even one Soviet representative being present on whom the responsibility can be placed, and that although we must maintain our rights we should not now seek to force a test of Soviet control in light of the larger problem which is developing. Accordingly, on this basis you are authorized to resume normal military motor convoys between West Berlin and West Germany at your discretion. State concurs.